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 ‘Symbolic and economic violence as forms of capital:  the globalising of the 
Scottish banking elite’. 
Abstract 
The recent financial crisis has raised urgent questions about the role of corporate elites 
in contemporary organizations and societies. The paper follows recent articles on 
organizational elites that argue for more critical sociological approaches to the study of 
organizational elites, including the use of Bourdieu’s concept of field, and studies of 
elites in contexts outside of North America (Zald & Lounsbury 2010; Maclean et al. 
2010). We look at the particular case of the Scottish banking elite, focusing on the 
changing enactment of forms of violence within fields, from symbolic violence (the 
traditionalists) to economic violence (the modernisers) (Bourdieu, 1980).We also trace 
the movement of the Scottish banking elite from the national to the global, showing how 
members of an elite field can operate simultaneously in the field of power within their 
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Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has raised urgent questions about the role of corporate elites 
in contemporary organizations and societies. In this paper, we therefore look at the 
particular case of the Scottish banking elite and their role in the crisis, using the concept 
of field and focusing on the changing enactment of forms of violence within fields, from 
symbolic violence (the traditionalists) to economic violence (the modernisers) 
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(Bourdieu, 1980). The paper is positioned in response to recent articles on organizational 
elites in this journal, that argue for a) more critical sociological approaches to the study 
of organizational elites, including (b) the use of Bourdieu’s concept of field; and (c) 
studies of elites in contexts outside of North America (Zald & Lounsbury 2010; 
Maclean et al. 2010).  
We answer to the call from Zald and Lounsbury (2010) to extend the study of 
organizational elites by providing a theoretically-driven but historically-grounded case 
study of the Scottish banking and financial elite, what Bourdieu calls ‘a special case of 
what is possible’ (Bourdieu, 1998:2). We focus on Scotland because of the central role 
played in the financial crises by its financial elite, defined by Maclean et al. (2010) as 
‘holders of positions of command’. In so doing we address the following question: how 
has a specific national elite been affected by/reacted to neoliberal globalisation and the 
crisis of neoliberal globalisation?  
 
Our theoretical contribution lies in further developing Bourdieu’s ideas and showing 
their adaptability in looking at how forms of violence within an organization can count 
as forms of capital outside that organization. This is a contribution to organization 
studies and goes back to the calls cited above to study elites and their impact on 
organizations.  
 
Elites and elite formation 
As already noted, recent articles in this journal and elsewhere have identified an 
ongoing absence of critical and sociological studies of organizational elites. For 
example, in their comprehensive survey of the largely US-focused literature on elites, 
Zald and Lounsbury note ‘the impoverished treatment of power and the study of elites 
and command posts in organizational studies’ (Zald & Lounsbury 2010:983-984). To 
address this gap, Zald and Lounsbury recommend utilising Bourdieu’s concepts as part 
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of ‘a reengagement with fundamental questions about elites and the organizational 
infrastructures they operate in and use to wield influence’ (Zald & Lounsbury 
2010:964). 
Of course, as Savage and Williams (2008) and Williams and Filippakou (2009) note, 
there is a long tradition of studies of elites and elite formation that goes back to Mosca 
and to Weber and includes Michels’ thesis of ‘iron rule of oligarchy’ which posits the 
inevitable concentration of power by elite groups (Michels, 1962) and Pareto’s theory of 
the circulation of elites (Pareto 1901/1991; see also Ocasio and Kim, 1999). In 
particular, Mills’ classic study of the ‘power elite’, which identified the links between 
US military, corporate and political elites is still regularly cited (Mills, 1958).  
Nevertheless, as Zald and Lounsbury (2010: 963) note: ‘Since the mid-20th century, 
organizational theorists have increasingly distanced themselves from the study of core 
societal power centers and important policy issues of the day’, choosing to focus 
instead ‘on cataloguing the factors that influenced organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness’ (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010:967). In particular, writers have noted the 
absence of critical studies of financial elites (Savage and Williams 2008:2). There are of 
course counter-examples, including the work of Dobbin (1993), Scott (2008), Domhoff 
(2006), Greenwood et al. (2008, in addition to Carroll’s (2009) work on transnational 
corporate elites. There has also been work on Korean elites (Yoo & Lee, 2009) and on 
the role of elites in post-soviet contexts: e.g., Eyal et al. (2003) and Bozóki (2003). But 
Clegg et al. (2006: 326) note that the study of elites remains a ‘missing link between 
studies of power and studies of democracy’ (see also Maclean et al. 2010:330).  
 
We situate this paper then in the recent resurgence of interest in sociological and critical 
studies of elites. Some of this literature (as Savage and Williams, 2008, note) has been 
inspired by Bourdieu, in particular his studies of Heidegger position in relation to 
philosophical field in Germany in the 1920s-1939s (Bourdieu, 1996), his study of the 
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French elite grandes écoles (Bourdieu, 1989) and his discussions of class and aesthetic 
taste (Bourdieu, 1979). Included in recent Bourdieusian-influenced work on 
organizational elites are Bennett et al. (2005) on cultural capital and British elites, the 
2008 Special Issue of Sociological Review which includes Harvey and Maclean (2008) 
on sports in relation to French and British business elites; LeBaron (2008) on central 
bankers and the field of power; Williams and Filippakou (2009) on elite formation in 
UK education; and Bennett et al. (2005) on traditional and new elites.  
 
Following on from the literature outlined above and responding to the gaps identified by 
e.g. Clegg et al. (2006) and Zald and Lounsbury (2010), we contribute to the further 
application of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework into organization studies (Author, 
2009a, 2009b), by looking at the role of specific elite and what counts as economic 
and/or symbolic violence for that elite. We therefore next explain Bourdieu’s central 
concepts of field, habitus, distinction, forms of capital, and symbolic violence, as we 
apply them in this study. 
 
Themes and concepts 
Bourdieu’s sociology has had a wide influence on the Anglophone academic world: see 
Hanks (2005), who provides an account of Bourdieu’s reception in the US, while 
Robbins (2005) discusses Bourdieu’s reception in the UK sociological field. Bourdieu 
has also influenced education studies (including educational leadership, see Lingard & 
Christie, 2003), sociology, international relations (see Leander, 2008), organization 
studies (see Golsorkhi et al. 2009), ethnographic studies (see Wacquant, 2005), and 
linguistic anthropology (see Hanks, 2005).  
 
Bourdieu developed his repertoire of concepts or ‘thinking tools’ (Leander, 2008: 1) 
based on empirical work in Algeria, the Bearn and in Paris in order to understand and 
critique power in an empirical world. We do not have the space here to enter into an 
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extended discussion of Bourdieu’s concepts and approach or to deal in any 
comprehensive way with his critics. We note in passing however that critiques of 
Bourdieu’s approach include: that it is reductive, inflexible, and unable to account for 
change (see Lescourret, 2008). It is worth noting here, however, both how Bourdieu’s 
thinking developed over time, especially in and after Meditations Pascaliennes 
(Bourdieu 1997) and subsequent developments by other Bourdieusian scholars: see, 
e.g., Lahire (1998), Sweetman (2003), Sapiro (2004), Wacquant (2005), and Hilgers 
(2009) in a recent Special Issue of Theory & Psychology dedicated to habitus. We also 
take note of Bourdieu’s (1997: 64) counsel against the ‘scholastic error’ of treating 
explorative, theoretical concepts as empirical phenomena (see also Vandenbergh 1999).     
We also contribute to the recent Bourdieusian turn in organization studies, which has 
particularly focused on issues of power, authority and change: see, e.g., Outhwaite 
(2007); Emirbeyer and Johnson (2008); Swartz (2008); Kerr & Robinson (2009); 
Golsorkhi et al. (2009). In this study, following Zald and Lounsbury (2010) and 
Maclean et al. (2010), we use Bourdieu’s concepts in order to study members of a 
specific elite in a particular socio-historical context and over a specific historical period. 
We also follow Emirbeyer and Johnson (2008), Swartz (2008) and Golsorkhi et al. 
(2009) in emphasising the benefit of using Bourdieu’s concepts together as a framework, 
while of course foregrounding specific concepts to meet the needs of a particular study. 
In this case we employ in particular Bourdieu’s concepts of field, symbolic violence, 
forms of capital, social trajectory and habitus. 
 
A social field consists of ‘a set of objective, historical relations between positions 
anchored in certain forms of power (or capital)’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992:16). 
Bourdieu thus uses the concept of field to refer to a social space in which social agents 
are positioned and position themselves in relation to each other (Bourdieu, 1991:215). 
Each field has its own capital, social, cultural or symbolic, that represents what is 
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valued, what allows a participant in a field to gain power and position (Bourdieu, 1986). 
For Zald and Lounsbury (2010:967), field is concept that is particularly useful for the 
study of elites in that it allows for the integration of macro and micro perspectives. It 
also allows us to identify homologies between fields internally and external social 
forces and consequently examine the remaking of fields by outsiders who are able to 
incorporate wider social change (e.g. Heidegger, see Bourdieu 1996).  
 
Bourdieu went on to extend the concept of field by introducing the field of power 
(Bourdieu, 1989). He does this in order to explain how ‘power is concentrated in 
definite institutional sectors and in given zones of social space; the field of power is 
precisely the arena... where the relative value of diverse species of power is contested 
and adjudicated’ (Wacquant 2005:144). In this formulation of the concept, Bourdieu is 
thinking about power at the level of the state. However, in Les structures sociales de 
l’économie, Bourdieu further develops the concept of the field of power in order to 
understand how power operates at the commanding levels of an organization (‘le champ 
de pouvoir au sein de la firme’), i.e., the organizational level of corporate dirigeants 
(Bourdieu 2000:252-254).  In Bourdieu’s view such organizational power relations are 
based on physical, economic or symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is the imposition 
of and misrecognition of arbitrary power relations, e.g., class, race, gender, as legitimate 
or even natural relations (Bourdieu, 1980; Wacquant 1993). However, according to 
Bourdieu, overt violence, i.e., physical and/or economic and symbolic violence can 
and do coexist within an organization or field: see Bourdieu (1980:217-218). But the 
relationships between these forms of violence changes constantly, under duress, for 
example, or by misrecognition: for a discussion of this see Terray (2002).  
 
In order to function effectively in a social field (Bourdieu argues), social agents need to 
acquire recognised forms of capital in order to establish their positions. Thus within each 
field there exists a struggle over the forms of capital that are properly legitimate within 
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that field and the accumulation of which amounts to distinction (Bourdieu, 1979). The 
forms of capital available in a field may be cultural capital, knowledge, skills and other 
cultural acquisitions, as exemplified by educational or technical qualifications, symbolic 
capital,  i.e., accumulated prestige or honour, or social capital, i.e., the networks a 
person can draw on as a resource. Bourdieu thus argues that the capital individuals 
possess partly defines how well they are accepted and integrated into a particular field, 
their legitimacy within that field and how they are able to position themselves within it.  
 
From this perspective, habitus can be understood as a disposition to enter and reproduce 
the field – and from this disposition a social agent moves to position-taking within the 
field (prises de position) (Bourdieu, 1994: 70-71). Habitus is inculcated through family 
background (habitus primaire), education and forms of experience (habitus secondaire) 
and can be identified by tracking the social trajectory of members of, or into, a particular 
field (Dezalay & Garth, 2002; Fourcade, 2009), i.e. through the study of ‘agent level 
habitus and positions of key personalities’ (Guilhot, 2004). The practical knowledge of 
such social agents is largely, though not entirely, ‘inconscient’: that is, we, as social 
agents, are not necessarily consciously aware of having acquired this practical 
knowledge, although it can be historicised and its origins disinterred. So, using field and 
forms of capital together, we can provisionally identify the ethos or generic habitus of a 
social field, such as the one in question in this study (Bourdieu, 1991; Hilgers, 2009). 
 
Data and methodology 
We define ‘elite bankers’ in the first instance relationally as those occupying dominant 
positions in the field of power within the internal hierarchy of a banking organization. 
Bourdieu calls these ‘a small number of exemplary individuals who combine all the 
properties and all the titles that confer membership rights’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 316). In this 
case, these are the chairmen, CEOs and in the case of the BOS, Governor and Treasurer 
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of the banks. We identify the social trajectory of specific and named social agents and 
by so doing (1) identify changes in the field of power within the organization, i.e., 
changes in ethos; (2) identify changes in the way that an elite is disembedded from a  
national field and integrated into a transnational field; and (3) identify changes in the 
forms of domination that shift from symbolic violence to economic violence. 
In this paper we focus on periods of crisis. This is for two reasons. First, crises offer 
opportunities to observe elite reconfiguration that may lead to ‘new or significantly 
altered regimes’ (Dogan & Higley, 1998:3). In addition, existential crises offer outsiders 
the chance to glimpse what is going on within the organization. In particular, crises, 
when the old way is held to be – or is – unsustainable -  are often times when critical 
voices can be heard. This means that data may be more easily collected both from 
participants, who are no longer subject to symbolic or economic violence, and in the 
press at such times of crisis. 
In this study, then, we present a theoretically-driven but historically grounded case, 
which allows us to ‘‘‘excavate the social conditions of possibility’’ in real world 
contexts’ (Leander, 2008: 20). When taking this approach, Leander goes on to note, 
‘the context defines what is relevant’, so, as a logical consequence ‘there can be no 
firm guidelines to what kind of material is useful for the analysis’ and therefore ‘the 
exact evidence that needs to be mustered will vary’ (Leander, 2008: 12). This means 
that ‘depending on their exact research focus, studies include things as diverse as 
statistical data, biographical CV information, photographical evidence, works of art or 
literature, analysis of classical texts, archival research, public speeches, newspaper 
clippings, or interviews’ (Leander, 2008: 12). For Bourdieu, an approach via 
secondary sources may be necessary in dealing with fields of power from the outside 
(Bourdieu, 2007: 22). 
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We therefore draw on sources in the public domain that are relevant to the context we 
are researching. Our data consist of a corpus of contemporary sources from the public 
domain that relate to the Scottish banks in the period 1999-2009. This corpus includes 
academic articles and articles from the UK financial press and from Scottish newspapers 
that narrate, describe and comment on the evolution of the Scottish banking sector, its 
leaders and its crises. In addition, we draw on the searchable online Who’s Who 2009 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) for details of the social/biographical trajectory of the 
Scottish banking leaders (for similar uses of biographical data see Lebaron, 2008, 
Williams & Filippakou, 2009).  
 
As already noted, the field under study here is that of the Scottish banking and financial 
elite. In order to construct a relational biography of this field we draw methodologically 
on Bourdieu (1986, 1996, 1998) and on the Bourdieusian approach of Dezalay and 
Garth (1998, 2002). According to Dezalay and Garth (2002:9-10), ‘biographical 
accounts of individual choices and career strategies… reveal the hierarchical structures 
and institutions in which the individuals and groups operate’. Using this relational 
approach and drawing on publically-available sources, we can then trace the social 
trajectories of individuals and reconstruct the field as it mutates from a semi-
autonomous national field to a transnational field of elite bankers (Bourdieu, 1998). So 
in following the categorisations in Bourdieu (1998), we can identify a concomitant 
change in the Scottish banking elite that replaces the moderates or ‘old guard’, i.e., 
proponents of national closure and the protection of localised interests, with the 
modernisers or insurgents, who aim to open up the relatively closed national field to the 
forces of transnational capital and its practices (Bourdieu, 1998; 2000).  
 
This historical/relational approach allows us to trace how the field of elite banking in 
Scotland mutated over a period of 30 years. First, under pressure from external forces, 
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the field mutates internally, then in its relation to the British financial field, centred on 
the City of London, and finally in relation to the globalising field of transnational 
banking and finance. Each of these fields can then be understood as ‘a symbolic terrain 
with its own networks, hierarchical relationships, and expertise, and more generally, its 
own rules of the game’ (Dezalay & Garth, 1998:16). The procedure that we follow 
involves identifying trajectories and relating these to social change, in this case a move 
from an ethos of noblesse oblige understood as symbolic violence to a more overt 
ethos of economic violence. Our distinct methodological contribution then is to draw on 
the press and biographical sources in order to help people looking in as outsiders – using 
Bourdieu’s concepts as thinking tools in performing a kind of ‘social Kreminology’ of 
the kind practised by scholars in order to study the opaque elite of the Soviet Union . 
 
Our findings are presented as provisional indicators, taking the form of  ‘conditional 
totalizations’ (Bourdieu 1991): i.e. that is, ‘by generalizing a theoretical opinion which, 
for lack of an ability to develop the empirical grounding that it needs, remains limited to 
the formulation of hypotheses’ (Hilgers 2009:732). In this study, then, we focus on the 
relationship between the two main Scottish banking organizations. These institutions are 
the Bank of Scotland (BOS) and the Royal Bank of Scotland (until 1991 ‘The Royal 
Bank of Scotland’, then ‘RBS’). Before turning to the banks themselves, we next discuss 
the historical position of banking in the development of Scottish society. 
 
The context of Scotland 
Scotland is a ‘historic’ nation, but not a wholly independent or fully-developed nation 
state (Bogdanor 1999; Williams 1996). This is because, although the political union of 
Scotland and England (1707) brought together two politically independent nations 
under a parliament in London, Scotland retained a national identity based on ‘a 
relatively autonomous civil society’ (McCrone 2005:68; see also Livesey, 2009). In 
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constructing and reproducing Scotland’s ‘historic’ national cultural identity, a powerful 
role was played by certain ‘nodal’ institutions (Sewell 1999). These include the Church 
of Scotland, the legal and educational systems, the media, and the financial institutions. 
The Scottish financial sector can therefore be seen as one of the elements that constitute 
an independent Scottish identity.  
Traditionally, the Scottish financial sector has traded on a reputation for prudence and a 
suspicion of risk-taking. We can trace this back to the Scottish post-Union settlement, 
which was based on the ascendancy, after years of religious turmoil, of the ‘Moderates’, 
the socially and politically conservative Presbyterians, at the expense of the more 
revolutionary Presbyterians and the Jacobite-supporting Scottish Episcopalians. The 
Moderate Presbyterian worldview was based on the dominant values of ‘prudence, 
stability and moderation’ (Kidd 2007a:108), supporting a tacit social agreement to 
‘coexist civilly’ (Skoczylas 2008). Presbyterian moderation also facilitated a focus on 
trade (Skoczylas, 2008), although the benefits of trade were to be attained through 
moderation and prudence, rather than through the risk-taking of the disastrous Darien 
Scheme (1698-1701), a doomed pre-Union attempt, supported by the more radical 
Presbyterian ministers (Davie, 2001), to set up a trading colony in Central America in 
competition with English colonialism. 
In considering the development of Scottish post-Union civil society, we can identify a 
social tension between revolutionary Presbyterianism and Moderate Presbyterianism and 
also a tension between both of these and the romantic conservatism of the Episcopalian 
Jacobites. However, according to Brown (1987), the values of Moderation and 
Episcopalianism were soon to grow closer: the Scottish elites were ‘increasingly English 
oriented’ (Brown 1987:16; see also Davie, 2001). Thus, ‘large numbers of the 
aristocracy and gentry remained loyal to a Church (the Episcopalian) which grew closer 
in doctrine and temper to the ‘high church’ wing of  the Church of England’ and could 
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be seen as ‘the landed classes at prayer’ (Brown 1987:2), while the Moderates also 
‘enjoyed the patronage of the rural landed classes’ (Brown, 1987: 16). 
 
In social trajectory, there was a trend amongst the Scottish social elite towards 
conformity with England, with sections of the elite abandoning the Scottish universities 
for ‘the English-style residential school and the older English Universities’ (Davie 1981: 
xix). Thus the trajectory of the Scottish banking elite was one in which there were ties 
with the English elite, through shared public schools, universities and sporting pursuits. 
We next discuss the social trajectory of the traditional Scottish banking elite. 
 
The Scottish banking field before 1990 
Before 1990 the senior management of the Scottish banks was dominated by an ‘old 
guard’ of traditionalists, moderate in ethos and conservative in outlook (Saville, 1996).  
The field could be characterised as one of gentlemanly bankers and noblesse oblige: 
that is, a regime in which the mode of domination was symbolic violence. There were 
two main social trajectories into the field. The first route was the Anglo-Scottish route, 
following a social trajectory from a Scottish independent preparatory school to an 
English ‘public’ school, then Oxbridge, and a period of military service (Appendix 1). 
As Fourcade (2009) notes, social distinction in England has been traditionally attained 
through ‘social class and passage through an elite educational institution’, plus the 
cultivation of ‘interpersonal networks’ rather than through formal qualifications per se 
(for the ethos of traditional ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in England, see Buchan, 2003; 
Mutch, 2006). These elite institutions – the public schools, Oxbridge, the armed forces 
-  can be seen as inculcating a sense of noblesse oblige or ‘public spirited elitism’ in 
social agents (Bourdieu, 1989; Fourcade, 2009: 33) and the social trajectory of the elite 
bankers reproduced this disposition in the Scottish context.  
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Key exemplars of this traditional trajectory are Bruce Pattullo, Governor of the Bank of 
Scotland, 1991-1998, and Michael Herries of the Royal Bank. Pattullo’s trajectory 
included Belhaven Scotland Hill School (an Edinburgh private school), Rugby 
(English public school), Oxford (Hertford College) and then the army. Herries also 
followed this traditional Anglo-Scottish elite trajectory, educated at Eton and Cambridge 
(Trinity), followed by army service, with a detour as taipan of Jardine Matheson in 
Hong Kong.  Pattullo’s and Herries’ leisure activities included those of the traditional 
Scottish landed elite, such as shooting (Herries) and hill walking (both). Both were 
members of the elite Caledonian and New clubs in Edinburgh, thus promoting a 
homogeneity of social capital (see Wacquant 2002: 139).  
This old guard of gentlemanly bankers embodied the traditional ‘Scottish’ banking 
values of prudence, propriety, caution, discretion, and ‘a highly sceptical view of 
fashion’ (Capie, 1996; Saville, 1996). Thus, according to George Graboys, CEO of the 
Rhode Island-based Citizens Bank:   
‘Sir Michael (Herries) was an honourable man and we shared the same values about 
prudence in banking. This was part of Scotland’s reputation’ (Kemp, 2011).  
 
This old guard can then be seen as moderates: their traditional approach to banking, their 
shared ethos, has been characterised as ‘sticking to the knitting’ and ‘don’t bet the bank’ 
(quoted in Saville, 1996), i.e. avoiding speculation and risk.  The long-term strategy of 
this group was to protect Scottish banking independence, particularly from the City of 
London, through a focus on the long term, on building local communities and 
developing local Scottish human capital (according to Saville, 1996).  
 
After the 1980s this situation dominated by an ethos of moderation changed. There were 
interrelated changes in trajectory and field, a new articulation of ‘Scottishness’ as 
modern and capitalistic (Kidd, 2007b): a new generation of insurgent modernisers 
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entered the field, replacing the noblesse oblige ethos with first, an Americanising 
modernity and then a competitive ‘eat or be eaten’ version of capitalism (Braudel, 
1992). In this move, symbolic violence as mode of domination was replaced by a more 
overt form of economic violence within the banks as organizations. In drawing out the 
tension between moderate Presbyterianism and revolutionary Presbyterianism, we are 
stuck by the way in which the victory of moderation seems to replay itself in reverse in 
the banks in the late 20th Century, in homology with Thatcherite reforms in UK the UK 
economy and society. 
The first crisis: Insurgency in the Royal Bank of Scotland (1992). 
The environment in which the UK banks operated changed in the 1980s. This was in the 
context of Thatcher’s ideological revolution (Hall 1988), which challenged traditional 
establishment authority, the old Tory elite, in favour of ‘meritocracy’. There was the 
‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the City in 1986 which permitted commercial banks and 
investment banks to operate together in one institution and the UK Financial Services 
Act (1986), which deregulated the British financial services industry, allowing 
building societies to demutualise and compete with the established banks for custom 
(Ingham, 2004; Brender & Pisani, 2009). This period also saw the end of the 
‘gentleman’s agreement’ by which the Scottish banks were largely confined to 
Scotland in return for the English banks staying out of Scotland (Saville, 1996). 
Although RBS maintained a presence in England through its Williams & Glyn 
subsidiary, this was absorbed into RBS itself in 1985. There was a homologous change 
in the ethos of the banking field in Scotland, which involved a turn away from the old 
Anglo-Scottish elite formation to an Americanised managerialism (Carroll 2009). 
 
In this changed financial environment the traditional old guard of the Royal Bank was 
seen to be ‘out of touch’ by the bank’s new CEO, George Mathewson. Mathewson, 
who became CEO in 1992, came from a non-elite background (see Appendix 1), with 
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degrees in maths and physics from Dundee, not then a university in its own right, and an 
MBA from a US college. In the US Mathewson acquired, via the aerospace industry in 
the US and then oil in Scotland, the cultural capital of the transnational general manager 
who could then import ‘modern’ US management ideas into what he considered the 
‘dependency culture’ of ‘traditional’ Scotland.   
In order to succeed in his insurgency and consolidate his position as CEO Mathewson 
needed to overthrow the old guard. In order to succeed in this, he required the support 
of the Chairman. This was ‘Gentleman George’ (Viscount) Younger, who, while a 
traditional Tory was also a member of the radical, neoliberal Thatcher government. In 
the overthrow of the old guard, Younger played the part of the conservative 
revolutionary, supporting the modernising Mathewson. The modernisers’ plan, 
codenamed ‘Nova Reda’ (Oram & Wellins, 1995:45) or ‘Nova Rada’ (Treanor, 1999), 
had as an aim, according to Mathewson, the destruction of the regime of the ‘feudal 
banklords’ by means of a sudden overnight coup, ‘a revolution, a putsch, total change’, 
destroying the ‘fiefdoms’ on which members of the old guard based their power within 
the bank (Jamieson & Flanagan, 2005).  
This displacement of the Royal Bank’s old guard by Mathewson and Younger was 
followed by a revolution from above, code-named ‘Project Columbus’, ‘a major re-
engineering project’. An important role in disseminating American-style organizational 
models is played here by the ‘shadow elite’ of management consultants (Wedel, 2009), 
including in the case of RBS, McKinsey, IMB, and Arthur Anderson, who were brought 
in to recommend ‘total’ change, following the then fashionable US management 
ideology of Business Process Re-engineering (BPR’s best known proponents are 
Hammer and Champy; see Hammer & Champy, 1993). Project Columbus had the ‘aim 
of revolutionizing the entire bank’ (Currie & Willocks 1998:140).  The bank’s 
operations were centralised, removing lending decisions from local branches 
(McConnell, 2006) and converting staff, who all had to reapply for their redesigned 
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jobs, into salespeople. The bank’s name was changed to ‘RBS’, one of the indicators of 
a corporate shift away from the local in anticipation of globalisation: we can see the 
same process happening with the renaming of British Petroleum as ‘BP’ and British 
Airways as ‘BA’. 
 
Project Columbus was run by a revolutionary ‘in-group’, ‘the change management 
group’, also known as ‘Columbites’. The leading Columbites were outsiders within the 
bank. These were: Tony Schofield, an Englishman who had joined RBS via the 
absorbtion of Williams and Glyn’s Bank, and Cameron McPhail who had followed 
Mathewson from the Scottish Development Agency, a key network by means of which 
members were able to build social capital within Scotland independently of the old 
guard’s networks. Like Mathewson, McPhail had no banking experience, although this 
was thought to be an advantage in that outsiders would be free of traditional received 
opinion and practices (Oram & Wellins, 1995:95). Indeed, as Rowlinson et al. (2006) 
point out, it may be in the interest of generalist managers that the organization’s 
dominated cadres do not possess specialist knowledge (Rowlinson et al., 2006: 697).   
 
The second crisis: the UK banking field (2000) 
Following ‘modernisation’, the strategy of both the RBS and BOS was to expand out 
from the Scottish banking sector by acquiring a major English Bank. This was in order 
(1) to establish domination in Scotland and then (2) to position the bank so that it could 
‘play the global banking game’ (Warner, 2006). The first potential target, Barclays, was 
ruled out by the English financial establishment (Observer, 2001). The next target, the 
NatWest, was considered an acceptable target by the City of London establishment. 
The struggle for the NatWest was represented in the UK media as being a struggle 
between Mathewson, CEO of RBS, and Peter Burt, Governor of the BOS (see, e.g., 
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Warner, 2006). Both of these leaders had a similar social trajectory into the elite field 
(see Appendix 1). Both were educated at Scottish schools and universities, worked for a 
period in the US and gained MBAs from US business schools. They also were given 
knighthoods by New Labour governments. There are, however, some differences in their 
social and cultural capital, Burt being somewhat closer to that of the traditional elite in 
that he was educated at a Scottish private school, while Mathewson went to Perth 
Academy, which was then a ‘senior secondary school,’, i.e. a selective state school, and 
then St Andrew’s, the oldest Scottish university, superior in cultural capital to Dundee. 
In addition, Burt’s MBA was from the highly-rated Wharton, superior in cultural capital 
to Mathewson’s Canisius College. 
Burt then was embedded in the social networks of the traditional Scottish elite, an 
insurgent who could present himself as a traditional insider. In contrast, Mathewson 
displayed the habitus of the outsider: he would not ‘call himself a Scottish banker’ but as 
a manager according to Goodwin (quoted in Garfield, 1999);  and as a Scottish National 
Party supporter did not fit the traditional banking field in England, displaying a kind of 
Scottish ressentiment vis-à-vis the City: he is reported as feeling that he had ‘never quite 
got the recognition he deserves in the Square Mile (the City of London)’, where Burt 
possessed more distinction: his social and cultural capital was higher (Garfield, 1999).  
However, Mathewson, supported by Younger and by his Deputy, Fred Goodwin, 
defeated the BOS. The RBS bought the NatWest and established unchallenged 
dominance in the Scottish field. The BOS had lost symbolically in the struggle. In the 
aftermath, Burt negotiated a ‘merger’ with the English bank, Halifax, the merged entity 
becoming HBOS, for Halifax Bank of Scotland, in Sept 2001. The BOS had given up its 
independence. As Hugh Young, one of the BOS old guard, stated, ‘Scotland and the 
Mound’, i.e., the BOS HQ, were no longer ‘the centre of gravity’, power had moved to 
the Yorkshire-based Halifax (Donald, 2009), with a subsequent loss of Scottish identity 
that was felt within the bank’s branches (Hearn, 2007).  
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Two years later, Burt resigned as head of the BOS, to be replaced by George Mitchell, a 
‘bootstrap boy’, school-leaver at 16, while Peter Cummings, another school leaver at 16, 
became Director Corporate Lending. These were the BOS’s dealmakers, while the 
‘sales-oriented’ Halifax controlled the senior positions on the board (Hearn, 2007).  
The third crisis: The field as transnational (2007) 
A key planning role in the NatWest takeover had been played by Fred Goodwin, 
Mathewson’s ‘trusted lieutenant’ (Warner, 2006). In 2001 Goodwin took over as CEO 
of RBS. He was at that time both the youngest CEO of a FTSE 100 company and the 
‘best banker in the world’ (Reid, 2007). Meanwhile, Mathewson became chairman of 
RBS and remained in that post as Goodwin’s mentor until 2006. In an increasingly 
transnational context, Goodwin pursued a strategy of expansion through acquisition, so 
that by the mid-2000s RBS was, after HSBC, the second biggest UK bank. In 2006 
Goodwin’s strategy of expansion was criticised by RBS shareholders and by the City of 
London, where Goodwin was accused of ‘megalomania’ by James Eden of Exane BNP 
Paribas. In response to these criticisms, Goodwin ruled out further takeovers (Kollewe, 
2005).   
So why, in order to pursue ABN Amro, the biggest bank in the Netherlands, did 
Goodwin go back on this commitment to consolidate the bank’s position and avoid 
further acquisitions? First, Barclays were at this time attempting to take over ABN 
Amro. Success would mean that Barclays would move ahead of RBS into second place 
in the UK banking field. There was also the need to position RBS in the transnational 
field, particularly within Europe. Goodwin, in partnership with the Belgian bank, Fortis, 
and Banco Santander, Spain, therefore entered into competition for ABN Amro.  
In the battle for position in the transnational/European field there was a replay of the 
BOS-RBS/incumbent vs pretender/insurgent struggle. This time the contestants were 
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Barclays and RBS, competing to challenge HSBC for dominance. RBS was the Scottish 
outsider, while Barclays was one of the preferred banks of the English elite (Willock, 
1993). The CEO of Barclays was John Varley, whose trajectory of public school and 
Oxford was that of the ‘gentlemanly banker’, converting the social capital acquired 
through marriage into the Quaker Pease family, Barclays being originally one of the 
Quaker banks, and the Pease family maintain a strong influence on the bank (Mathias, 
1969).  
In contrast, Goodwin was educated in Scotland, upwardly mobile, educated at fee-
paying Paisley Grammar school and then. the was the first of his family to go to 
university, at Glasgow University. After university, he operated as an accountant and 
management consultant and was involved in the privatisations and liquidations of the 
Thatcher period. His reputation had been made in takeovers and cost cutting, while 
Varley was believed to lack the ‘toughness’ of Goodwin.  
In October 2007, the RBS-led consortium won, paying £49 billion (80% in cash) for the 
Dutch bank (Lanchester, 2009). However the international financial system was already 
on the edge of disaster (Brender & Pisani, 2009; Lanchester, 2009). In October 2008 the 
stock market collapsed and the money markets ‘froze’. In the changed environment, 
ABN Amro was considered to be ‘overvalued’ and loaded with toxic debt. Goodwin, 
apparently obsessed by the pursuit of ABN Amro in a deteriorating economic climate, 
also missed problems of ‘toxic assets’ and bad debt in RBS itself (Lanchester, 2009).  
In January 2009, RBS posted the largest loss in UK corporate history, which was 
followed by a UK government bailout and part-nationalisation. Meanwhile, HBOS, also 
weighed down with toxic assets and risky investments, many made by Peter Cummings 
and his ‘bank within a bank’, was forced by Gordon Brown to merge with Lloyds 
Bank1. In the aftermath of the banking crisis, both Goodwin and Tom McKillop, who 
had replaced Mathewson as Chair, resigned. At HBOS, the Chair Lord Stevenson 
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Using Bourdieu’s conceptual framework we identify a homology (1) between the old 
guard ethos of noblesse oblige and the moderate Conservative ethos of the post WW-II 
UK social settlement: for example Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Then we identify 
(2) a further homology between the revolutionary ethos of the Thatcher period that 
replaced the post-war consensus and the ethos of the US-trained managerial insurgents 
within the elite banking field. Under the old guard, the Scottish banks can be imagined 
as a paternalistic and conservative family, reproducing a local Scottish identity of 
prudence and caution, both as external image (‘trust us’) and as internal bank culture 
(Hearn, 2007). But this traditional ethos of the moderate Scottish Protestant banker 
comes to be seen as ‘old-fashioned’, no longer adapted to the field as it mutated into a 
more globalised social space. The new managerial disposition includes a preferential 
turn to the US for business practices and ideas: for example, Mathewson’s and Burt’s 
MBAs from US institutions and the symbolically named ‘Columbus Project’ in which 
RBS ‘set sail’ for a new business world. Similarly, in France Bourdieu notes a similar 
process, with the ‘patronat intégriste’ being replaced by the ‘patronat moderniste2’, 
with its latest management techniques (‘dernières techniques du management) imported 
from the United States (Bourdieu, 1979:358).   
Because they have no investment in ‘the traditional culture of banking’ (Fincham, 
2000:186), such modernisers can form ‘an enlightened avant-guard, able to conceive, 
desire, and direct the change necessary’ (Bourdieu 1979:319). They are then able to 
revolutionise the organization, in the RBS case by ‘transforming the branch structure 
into something nearer a series of sales outlets’ (Fincham, 2000:186) and ‘replacing all-
purpose branch managers with specialists in customer service’ (Fincham, 2000:185). So 
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in the modernised bank, staff are transformed from professional advisers embedded in 
the community into salespeople with sales targets to meet, as evidenced by the ‘cabbage 
and cauliflower’ approach to motivation in BOS where staff who failed to meet sales 
targets had a vegetable placed in public view on their desks (see Scott, 2005).  
 
This change in elite composition is linked to changes in what capitals count in the field: 
i.e., what counts in Scotland is no longer the elite cultural capital acquired in England - 
the shared British elite formation - but a post-Thatcher ‘meritocracy’ of Scottish 
management generalists, MBAs, cost cutters and risk takers, many formed by 
Thatcherite practices such as privatisation: this is Goodwin’s trajectory. Within RBS 
itself Goodwin’s domination was maintained by economic violence. The RBS’s internal 
culture has been characterised as a ‘culture of fear’, specifically by 200 senior staff on 
an away-day in 2001; to which the 6ft3 Goodwin responded, ‘you’re not afraid of little 
me’ (as recounted in Dey & Walsh, 2009). There were for example rituals of humiliation 
when managers, watched by Goodwin, had to give karaoke performances. In particular 
the morning management meetings, known as ‘morning prayers’ or ‘morning beatings’, 
were used in this way (Dey & Walsh, 2009). This ritual of humiliation applied in 
particular to Goodwin’s treatment of Johnny Cameron (CEO Corporate Markets, 2006-
2009) whose trajectory was that of an old Scottish aristocratic and army family (Harrow, 
then Oxford), and who is reported to have been a particular victim of Goodwin’s attacks. 
In relation to Goodwin, Cameron was the dominated subordinate, thus reversing the 
‘old’ elite order of dominant/dominated.  
This overt economic violence was then translated into the capital that Fred Goodwin 
would use of assert his dominance within the RBS’s internal field of power and then, in 
the struggle with Barclays, to manoeuvre within the transnational field of elite banking. 
Goodwin’s reputation for economic violence also counts as symbolic capital. So we 
have nicknames such as ‘Fred the Shred’ (Koenig, 2003), or ‘the pacman’, after an early 
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computer game in which the ‘pacman’ moved around the screen eating everything in its 
way, and claims that Goodwin can ‘rip out costs and drive through efficiencies’ (Dey & 
Walsh, 2009). This reputation for economic violence counts as capital both externally, 
e.g. within the City of London, and internally, within the RBS’s own internal field of 
power. Externally, this reputation for economic violence contributed to Goodwin’s 
getting the RBS job and then to the City’s backing him over the ABN Amro takeover.  
As we have noted, the relationships between forms of violence changes constantly: 
under duress, for example, or by misrecognition: for a discussion of this see Terray 
(2002). In the banking field, the insurgent modernisers replace the moderate old guard. 
The old guard’s noblesse oblige form of symbolic violence, the ‘collective bad faith 
through which the group conceals from itself the very foundation of its existence and its 
power’ (Bourdieu 1979: 318), is replaced by a regime of overt economic violence: i.e., 
‘economic agents who live by the plain unvarnished truth of economic relations… 
people who are incapable of putting into these relations enough bad faith to conceal, to 
themselves as to others, their truth’ (Bourdieu, 1979: 318).  
This means that there is a reconfigured elite field, with an ethos of economic violence 
and ‘eat or be eaten’ competition. But this is one in which, by focusing on elite 
competition, elite members risk becoming detached and disconnected from their own 
organizations. This is what seems to have happened with Goodwin (Askeland, 2008) 
and also at HBOS, where the senior management lost track of the loans made by Peter 
Cummings’: ‘operationally (Goodwin) wasn’t in control’ (Independent, 2009). In 
addition, in the case of Goodwin, the replacement of Mathewson as Chair by Sir Tom 
McKillop seems to have removed the restraint provided by Mathewson as Goodwin’s 
mentor.  
 
Now (2010-2011), as post script, we may be able to detect a homology between the new 
banking leadership and the new political era in the UK, following the general election of 
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2010: namely a restoration of the traditional elite. The new CEO of RBS was Stephen 
Hester, with a degree in PPE from Oxford, depicted in the press riding out in the 
uniform of a Master of Foxhounds. Hester’s  background is one shared with the coalition 
government leaders, David Cameron, George Osborne and Nick Clegg,: i.e., a shared 
public school/Oxbridge trajectory.  
 
Conclusions 
In the introduction to this paper we posed the following question: how has a specific 
national elite been affected by/reacted to neoliberal globalisation and the crisis of 
neoliberal globalisation? In answering this question, we make two main contributions to 
studies of elites. Our substantive contribution is to trace the movement of the Scottish 
banking elite from the national to the global, from small nation banking institutions to 
transnational organizations. Our contribution in this area answers the call for 
contextualised studies of specific elites. 
 
In doing this we looked at Scotland as a specific case of a ‘historic’ nation without a 
state, a national identity constructed around institutional nodes such as its financial 
institutions. The role of the banks in reproducing a valued national self-image might 
help to explain the emotional investment that many Scots placed in the independence 
and probity of the banks as national institutions and thus the disappointment felt and 
expressed at their failure, seen as it was as a kind of national and moral betrayal (Kemp, 
2011).   
 
We also note the role played by insurgent outsiders: compare the way the financial crisis 
has played out in Iceland (Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir, 2010) or Ireland (Regling & Watson 
2010). One thing is different:  the UK government was able to bail out the Scottish 
banks, whereas with Ireland and Iceland the banks were bigger than the national 
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economies.  However, the effects of the bank bail-out continue to be felt in this period of 
‘austerity’ in the UK: elite manoeuvres and battles can have serious consequences for 
ordinary people and organizations: taxpayers and SME owner-managers, for example, 
who are unable to get loans. 
 
Our theoretical contribution is made in furthering the application of Bourdieu’s 
framework to the study of organizational elites. We do this by showing how an ‘old 
guard’ is challenged and replaced by a new corporate elite of insurgents. Thus, before 
symbolic violence can be recognised as a form of capital by other members within the 
same field, it must first be established as economic or symbolic violence in the internal 
field of power of the organization.  This means (1) that a regime of symbolic violence 
may be replaced by a regime of economic violence. This also means (2) that economic 
violence can be interpreted as symbolic violence, depending on the perspective of the 
interpreter. So within the organization, violence may be symbolic in that it is 
misrecognised, for example, as an emotional relationship or as ‘charm’, or it may be 
economic, i.e.,  it is a kind of violence which is recognised as such but submitted to for 
brutal economic reasons. Further, from a perspective within the elite field but outside the 
organization, symbolic violence and/or economic violence can count as a form of 
capital. Thus members of an elite field may operate simultaneously in the field of power 
within their own organization and at the same time in a transorganizational and 
increasingly transnational (Sklair, 2001) field of peer-competitors. Symbolic violence is 
then a means of distinction within that field (Bourdieu 1997: 126-127), is recognised as 
a form of capital and counts as such.   
 
In many ways, this paper is exploratory: we use the concepts to try to work out what has 
happened and how it has happened as an important contribution to a growing body of 
literature and a first step towards a wider research programme. We therefore concede the 
need for more empirical data. In addition, this outsider account raises, we think, further 
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questions. In particular, what was the lived experience of those insiders who worked in 
the banks and how did they understand, e.g. Mathewson’s or Goodwin’s leadership? 
How might these be researched? What is the phenomenology of domination? How 
might such accounts be accommodated within a Bourdieusian analysis? Then at a more 
global level, in the struggle between the post-Westphalia states and neoliberal 
capitalism, are the nation states increasingly like Scotland, i.e., ‘historic’ in the sense of 
possessing nodal national institutions but increasingly hollowed out as states by the 
power of transnational capital? Given the power and influence of financial elites both in 
small countries and transnationally, studies of such elites that employ Bourdieu will we 
suggest, help us to reconnect and engage with these vital issues of ‘power, authority and 
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1  This merger/takeover was opposed by the old enemies Burt and Mathewson 
(supported in this by Scottish PM Alex Salmond, a former RBS economist), but the 
political decision to merge had been taken in London (possibly in order to thwart the 
SNP’s ambitions to expand the independent Scottish financial sector).  
2 Patronat translates into English as ‘employers’. However, while patronat moderniste 
can be translated as ‘modern’ or better ‘modernising employers’, patronat integritse 
contains an analogy with religious integrisme. Integrisme is normally translated into 
English as ‘fundamentalism’.  This is however a notoriously inexact equivalent of 
integrisme which does not imply a return to fundamentals, but rather a focus on essential 
values.  In the present context we suggest that ‘traditional employers’ will have to do. 
